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THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: A
DIRGE FOR THE THEORISTS OF
MAJORITY RULE?
RonALu BRimwELL*
We are not prepared to accept that government can become, on the grounds of "efficiency," or for any other reason, a
single undifferentiated monolithic structure, nor can we assume
that government can be allowed to become simply an accidental agglomeration of purely pragmatic relationships. Some
broad ideas about "structure" must guide us in determining
what is "desirable" organization for government.**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a time not long past, I used to read newspaper accounts
of events in distant parts of the world, places I have never been
and really do not begin to understand, places like Afghanistan or
Iran. One thing that particularly fascinated me was the attitude
expressed by the people there about the United States, and I
often marvelled at how the rhetoric with which some irate Persian expressed his conception about what America really stood
for seemed like platitudinous sing-song dogmatism calculated to
strike some reactionary emotional nerve among the faithful,
rather than embodying some intelligent, factual criticism. I used
to think that perhaps these pronouncements, if they were translated correctly, provided at least a crude and fleeting glimpse
into some intellectual structure thoroughly foreign to that in our
portion of the western world, an insight into modes of thought
and expression that turned familiar semantic, linguistic, and literary devices, like metaphor and allegory, into challenging and
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. A.B., Midwestern
University, 1967; J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1970; LL.M., Harvard University,
1971.
** M. V ME,CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 10 (1967).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

1

SouTH
CAROLINA
LAW Vol.
REVIEW
South
Carolina
Law Review,
31, Iss. 4 [1980], Art.[Vol.
3

31

mysterious forms of communication. There was a certain charm,
I confess, in the feeling that I was in contact with something intellectually and culturally alien. When I read about a popular
Iranian magazine which declared that "[t]his Devil-like Carter
must by our own hand be destroyed," and that his life should
"reach a dead-end and the CIA go into the void!,"' I knew I was
in the presence of something astoundingly unlike an American
newspaper editorial, or even a placard slogan at a popular demonstration in this country. Are we really "the great devil?" 2 I
would sometimes say to myself, "Do these people really think
this way?" The excitable rhetorical tone, the constant and predictable appeal to the implicit rightness of particular dogma, the
obsession with certain inspired goals, the complete lack of humor, the fanatical sense of mission, the measurement of all
things, all people and all actions by their service to the cause,
were, I thought, phenomena comparable to the dominance of religious dogma in the explanation of secular events that typified
much early historiography. 3 In short, I felt all this was as foreign
1. The State (Columbia, S.C.), Nov. 13, 1979, at 1 (caption to "Devil-Like Carter").
2. Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1979, at 24, col. 3.
3. See H. BARNEs, A HISTORY OF HmTiomcAL Wsrrmo 41-54 (1962). "[A]llegory and
symbolism replaced candor and critical analysis as the foundations of the historical
method." Id. at 43. Compare the principal essays found in Symposium, 6 HASTMNGS
CONST. L.Q. 403-526 (1979) with the views attributed to Father Origen (A.D. 186-255):
Whenever we meet such useless, nay impossible incidents and precepts as
these we must discard literal interpretation and consider of what moral interpretation they are capable, with what higher and mysterious meaning they are
fraught, what deeper truths they were intended symbolically and in allegory to
shadow forth. The divine wisdom has of set purpose contrived these little traps
and stumbling-blocks in order to cry halt to our slavish historical understanding of the text, by inserting in its midst sundry things that are impossible and
unsuitable. The Holy Spirit so waylays us in order that we may be driven by
passages which, taken in the prima facie sense cannot be true or useful, to
search for the ulterior truth, and seek in the Scriptures which we believe to be
inspired by God a meaning worthy of him.
H. BARnEs, supra at 43-44 (quoting F. CoNYBEARE, A HISORy OF NEW TESTAMENT CR'rIciram 14-15 (1910)). See also R.SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAs CoRPus 27 (1969).

Certainly there is an argument to be made that the increased use of federal
habeas corpus is one of the best indications of the vitality of the American legal
system. For if it is true that it has been the vessel through which doubt has
been infused into the system, this will be construed as weakness only by the
weak. As long as doubt does not weaken the springs of action, it must always
and everywhere be taken as a blessing. There is no other way.
Id. (footnote omitted). Whether the good served is anti-Americanism, minority protection,
habeas corpus or God, the dogma of the second and third centuries has found its functional counterpart in the modem writers on American constitutional law. This essay will
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as it could be to the standards of evaluation and analysis, and to
the intellectual approach we employ in understanding and explaining our own institutions, and our own Constitution.
This oriental dream lasted until I took a close look at the
writing on American constitutional law, at which time it was,
like the utopia of Lord Ali-Baba,' sadly dispelled. For here,
amidst the nation's finest legal journals, scattered among occasional citations to judicial decisions, one can find everything
from a modem legal anti-reformation, in which "transubstantiat[ion]" 5 once again replaces the priesthood of believers, to the
more mundane revelation that the "promise of America's greatness will have come much closer to fulfillment" only when we
have achieved "a truly sex-neutral society." I confess with sadness and humility that this mystifies me as much as translations
of Iranian news magazines. But to be a bit more serious, one
finds here some similarities. One finds the nearly universal adoption of a standard of analysis applied to constitutional issues-particularly the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States-that amounts literally to nothing more than the
attempt to define the legitimacy of judicial action solely according to its conformity to preconceived objectives and an identification of the fait accompli of a modem judicial revolution as a
justification for its occurrence. I imagine most everybody likes to
see things turn out right, and we are told Americans like to have
a happy ending. But I am convinced that when, "[s]ometimes it
seems as if the ultimate test of a constitutional theory in our
time is what effect it will have on the continuing validity of
Brown v. Board of Education,"7 and when result orientation beexplore this parallel in function and methodology.
4. H. BELLoc, Lord Ali-Baba, in CAUTnONARY VERSES 270 (1941).
5. Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in
American Government, 66 GEo. L.J. 1191, 1192 (1978).
6. Kanowitz, The ERA: The Task Ahead, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637, 662 (1979).

7. R. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction-An Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Clauses, Part I, at 4 (1979) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with South CarolinaLaw
Review). I am deeply indebted to Professor Ralph U. Whitten of Creighton University
School of Law for allowing me to read his booklength manuscript, an in-depth review of
the meanings ascribed to "due process" and related concepts as well as "full faith and
credit" in British law, the legal history of the American colonies of Britain, the post-

revolutionary Articles of Confederation period, and the post-constitutional period up to
and after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868. He has challenged many
established theories, raised very serious questions about several recent Supreme Court
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comes so institutionalized that prefigured results, defined in this
case by some narrow segment of society, become virtually the
sole touchstone of legitimacy, we should-we-must-pause for a
bit more self-criticism and self-evaluation of intellectual standards than we have as yet undergone. For in no area of legal
scholarship have the techniques of the committed polemicist and
the rhetorical excess of result-oriented journalism come to dominate as in the area of American constitutional law. If we feel at
all moved by Trevelyan's dictum that "[d]isinterested curiosity
is the life-blood of real civilization,"" we may benefit by asking
ourselves whether our satisfaction with results has been so great
as to cause our scholarly standards to atrophy. The current debate, perhaps schism, that has emerged in the constitutional law
as a result of the writing of Professor Raoul Berger is instructive.
It will, I think, be useful to review the basis of the growing criticism of Berger's work to test the hypothesis that legal literature
in this area has undergone an unprecedented conversion from a
rather complex analytical set of criteria for the assessment of judicial action to an almost completely polemical, journalistic
commitment to particular results. Initially, I must say that it is
clear we are looking for a distinct trend or movement in the literature. Notions of utility and impressions about the correctness of
particular results have naturally always been there,' and even
within this currently dominant mode of constitutional analysis
the zeal of some individual convert may waver or break. But
what we are examining is the degree to which result and policy
commitments typify or dominate current thinking and set the
tone in this area, and whether the current degree is compatible
with the intellectual standards of scholarship.
It is certain that Berger has said a number of things with
which a great many persons vigorously disagree, so the initial
task will be to briefly describe what he has said and then evaluate the reasons why so many people say they are disturbed. I
should, however, make several things clear at the start. First,
opinions, and generally illuminated the whole field of inquiry into the established limitations on judicial power. Anyone seriously interested in this subject will have to deal with
the evidence he has discovered and the arguments he makes for its meaning and significance in American legal history and constitutional law.
8. G. TREVELYAN, ENGLISH SocIAL HISTORY 10 (1942).
9. See Arnold, Statutes as Judgments: The Natural Law Theory of Parliamentary
Activity in Medieval England, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 329 (1977).
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although Berger has described me as "ambivalent""0 on these issues, I am not. However much I may approve of the results of
some of the decisions of our Supreme Court, I feel that the current orthodoxy in constitutional analysis is unacceptable, in
point of the reasonable standards of scholarship, and I do not
mind saying so. I will elaborate more on this shortly. Second, I
believe a serious recommitment to a thorough and critical articulation of the standards of legitimacy in the area of judicial authority, as opposed to an almost reflexive preoccupation with results, is a precondition to converting constitutional law
scholarship in America from a footnoted journalistic battleground for ideologues into a respectable intellectual challenge.' 1
10. Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review: A Continuing Dialogue, 31 S.C.L. Ray.
171, 188 (1980).
11. It is difficult to make any comments in this area without being put into one
particular camp or another, and so long as the descriptive generalizations are helpful and
distinguish between positions in a meaningful way, this is fine. There is, however, as the
reaction to Berger's work demonstrates, an occasional tendency among those more emotionally committed to a position to rely heavily upon an ad hominem and pejorative
approach to those who think differently. I think this reveals an inability to formulate a
position of substance. See Soifer, Book Review, 67 Gao. L.J. 1281, 1281 n.3 (1979) (Berger's work categorically described as "the naive style"); Gibbons, Book Review, 31
RuTGERs L. Rav. 839 (1978). In his review, Judge Gibbons, after a free-style rhetorical
and polemical exercise that would do the Saturday Evening Post or Time magazine
proud, ranks Berger as one with insufficient talent or knowledge to be taken seriously and
delivers an off-the-cuff remark about Berger's musical abilities. Our Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Patricia Harris, attributes Berger's constitutional opinion to his
unspoken resentment of the progress made by minorities. Harris, Address to the Fellows
of the American Bar Foundation, 30 S.C.L. Rav. 485, 488-90; see Bridwell, The Federal
Judiciary:America's Recently Liberated Minority, 30 S.C.L. Rav. 467, 480 (1979). (Are
we to respond that, in her heart, she resents white middle-class values?) Suffice it to say
a gentlemanly (or ladylike) standard of intellectual dialogue does not prevail when the
emotional commitment of the participants runs so deep, and this is unfortunate. Members of the federal bench are generally less disturbed about judicial activism than others,
as one might guess, and occasionally essay to defend it. See, e.g., Wright, The Role of the
Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-JudicialActivism or Restraint?, 54 CoRnNaL L.
REv. 1, 28 (1968) (asserting judicial entitlement to legislate whenever the Court judges
the legislature to be remiss or slow in performing its duties). Sometimes, however, a
frank recognition of the Court's new-found role is expressed disapprovingly from the
bench. Justice Robert J. Donnelly of the Supreme Court of Missouri has observed:
It is a fact that at some point in time after World War II the Supreme
Court of the United States ceased to function as a court. It molded itself into
an organ for control of social policy and made that policy effectual by utilization of the Fourteenth Amendment to amend the Constitution according to the
predilections of the majority.
State v. Handley, 585 S.W.2d 458, 466 (Mo. 1979). A somewhat different attitude about
the merits of scholarly dialogue is expressed from time to time. This attitude equates
criticism with destructiveness and appears to regard a harmony of prevailing opinions as
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Berger apparently never bothered to follow up on the story
of the little boy who, confronted with the emperor's "new
clothes," naively pointed out his nakedness. What happened to
the little boy after that? Well, we now know that he spent the
rest of his life defending various civil actions brought by and on
behalf of the king.' 2 At any rate, the guild is now against Professor Berger, and his treatment in the legal journals is the modem
scholarly equivalent of a trial for heresy.
3 in
The recent symposium on his Government by Judiciary"
the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly" demonstrates as
much, and it is instructive to examine the opinions expressed in
the essays contained in it in order to appreciate just what the
current controversy in this area is all about. It is quite striking to
note, for example, that all the essays in the symposium were
fundamentally opposed to Berger's views. Whether the editors
chose a symposium format that arrayed every contributor
against Berger, and then elicited the responses so as to heighten
the impression that everyone everywhere is against him, is not
clear. If any supportive contributors were invited to the party,
they did not show up. Yet, in some ways, this editorially orchestrated isolation does give an accurate impression of how Berger's
work has raised the hackles of academe generally. So examining
the particular nature of the assorted criticism of his work is more
important than a "count of noses."' 5

II. THE BERGER THESIS
Berger's basic thesis is that the records of the 39th Congress
demonstrate a vital link between both statutory and constitutional measures for the benefit of freedmen' 6 and the "privileges
and immunities" clause in Article IV of the United States Con-

a primary virtue. See Presser, Book Review, 22 Am.J. LEGAL HIST. 359 (1978). I cannot

agree with either approach, and hope to express my opinions about the heated topic
bluntly but without resort to the purely ad hominem.
12. Blieberg, Emperor's New Clothes, Barron's, June 1, 1976, at 7.
13. R. BERGER, GovERNmENT BY JuDIcIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FoURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977). It is this book that has triggered all the current controversy.
14. Symposium, supra note 3, at 403-635 (1979). The symposium consists of six comments on Berger's work and theories, id. at 403-526, and Berger's separate responses to
each essay, id. at 527-635.
15. See Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review: An Ongoing Debate, 6 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 527, 528 (1979).
16. See Bridwell, Book Review, 1978 DUKE L.J. 907, 909-11.
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stitution." As revealed in the case of Corfield v. Coryell," this
privileges and immunities clause protects in-residents of any
state from statutory discriminations related to specified "fundamental rights."" These rights consist of "(1) personal security;
(2) freedom of locomotion; and (3) ownership and disposition of
property." 0 Linking the 1866 Civil Rights Act 2' to these enumerated rights by virtue of the frequent references in its legislative
history to both Coryell and Article IV, Berger construes this 1866
Act to outlaw discrimination as to these fundamental rights. The
privileges and immunities clause of the later-adopted fourteenth
amendment extended the protection that Article IV afforded
transient citizens to the newly created citizens of each state; this
protected those new citizens from discrimination in matters covered by the same trinity of basic rights. Further, in formulating
the basic clauses of the fourteenth amendment-the privileges
and immunities clause, the equal protection clause and the due
process clause-the framers intended to exclude both suffrage2
and segregation 23 from its coverage. As to these three clauses,
"one revealed the scope and nature of the rights protected, the
next established an equality of enjoyment as to these particular
rights, and the latter guaranteed the judicial protection of these
rights on an equal basis for all residents." 2'
Therefore, these constitutional provisions not only fail to
justify the creation of additional substantive constitutional
rights, but they actually exclude such creation from their scope.
As Berger has stated, "It is, therefore, as if the Amendment expressly stated that 'control of suffrage shall be left with the
States.' "2 Therefore, the landmark opinions of the United
States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 28 Oregon v. Mitchell, 2
and Reynolds v. Sims, 28 which brought the Supreme Court into

17. U.S.

CONST. art. IV, § 2.
18. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).

19. Id. at 551-55.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 21.
Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 52-68, 75-77, 93.
Id. at 119 nn.10 & 12.
Bridwell, supra note 16, at 911.
R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 7-8.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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the field of reapportionment, were unconstitutional, as was the
desegregation opinion announced by Chief Justice Warren in
9
Brown v. Board of Education."
Many of the details of Berger's reconstruction of pertinent
legislative history of the fourteenth amendment have been challenged." But this attempt to refute Berger's thesis is actually
much less important than another related approach employed by
his critics. For Berger's work is based on the underlying assumption that the clearly expressed intent of the framers of any given
constitutional provision is relevant if it can be demonstrated.
That is, the judicial function does not extend to revising or ignoring clear constitutional provisions on policy grounds. 31 Thus,
if one gets past the thorny question of interpretation and arrives
at a clear meaning in a constitutional provision, Berger raises
what is in fact the most important and basic question of constitutional law as such. The interpretation of the Constitution and
the understanding of the meaning of it is really a lesser issue
included in the greater issue of judicial authority. Berger states
this fundamental question straightforwardly: "On traditional canons of interpretation, the intention of the framers being unmistakably expressed, that intention is as good as written into the
text." Therefore, we confront the issue: "[G]iven a clearly discernible intention, may the Court construe the Amendment in
undeniable contradiction of that intention?" 33
If one accepts arguendo, as lawyers often do, the clarity of
the fourteenth amendment on these two points of segregation
and suffrage, or if one picks some other arguably unambiguous
constitutional provision, such as the express two-year term for
Congressmen, 3 could the Court on policy grounds contradict
the Constitution-say, for example, provide three- or four-year
terms?
I have elsewhere expressed 5 several reservations about certain aspects of Professor Berger's work regarding which I should
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. See, e.g., Kutler, Raoul Berger's FourteenthAmendment: A History or Ahistoricat, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511, 519-20 (1979).
31. R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 300-11; Berger, supra note 13, at 537.
32. R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 7 (footnote omitted).
33. Berger, supra note 15, at 530.
34. See id. at 530 (citing Kay, Book Review, 10 U. CoNN. L. REv. 801, 804 (1978)).
35. E.g., Bridwell, supra note 16 passim.
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offer a brief clarification. My most basic problem with his Government by Judiciary is the fact that I was troubled by the limited utility of the primary device for constitutional interpretation
upon which Berger relied-namely the intent of the framers.,
However, I was careful to note that it is "unfair to dull Mr. Berger's accomplishments by pointing out what he did not do."3
Berger has, however, reiterated that his narrow focus in Government by Judiciary was to illustrate the revolutionary and improper character of particularjudicial decisions that were contrary to the unmistakable intent of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment. 31 On the case that Berger made against those particular decisions-I must conclude he is correct; if my comments
on his approach resulted from a "misapprehension" of his "very
narrow focus," 9 I will gladly acknowledge the error. I feel for
purposes of this essay, the constitutional problems Berger analyzes are perfectly demonstrated within this "very narrow focus"
and I will attempt to deal with the issue he raises without digressing into the peripheral problems of general theories of constitutional interpretation. I do have some reservation about Berger's use of some of his evidence, but as will appear later, even
these misgivings are not really critical to the central, great constitutional issue he raises. One example concerns his use of statements of certain framers, such as those of Alexander Hamilton.
These are, sometimes I feel, taken so much out of context that
they may in fact mean exactly the opposite of what they are intended to illustrate. But the error is a common one and involves
a rather technical problem of legal history. For example, Berger
is fond of quoting Alexander Hamilton's statement that the term
due process of law is only "applicable to

. .

.proceedings of the

courts of justice; they can never be referred to an act of the legislature."4" Berger takes this statement to mean that there can be
no constraints on legislation resulting from the application of the
due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, since Hamilton's statement really signifies as much and exemplifies the accepted meaning that the well-settled term of art had to those
36. Id. at 912-16.

37. Id. at 916.
38. See Berger, supra note 10.

39. Berger, supra note 10, at 172.
40. Quoted in R. BERoR, supra note 13, at 194; Berger, supra note 10, at 183. See 4
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
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who drafted the Constitution and its fifth amendment, which
contained this term. Since the fourteenth amendment referred to
the same standard understanding of the term "due process," it
also embodied no substantive restrictions on legislative action,
at least none to which a court could resort to challenge or overturn legislation. When understood in its full context, however,
Hamilton probably meant the very opposite, as I see it. I am
indebted to Professor Whitten, who explored at length the background of the adoption of the due process guarantee in the fifth
and fourteenth amendments and the meaning that those terms
assumed in their application. As Professor Whitten points out,
Hamilton's comments in the New York Senate were directed
against the adoption of a statute that would have extended the
disqualification for the holding of public office to include owners
of vessels engaged in privateering." The New York Senate had
just approved a declaration of rights which guaranteed that "no
men shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any right, but by
due process of law, or the judgment of his peers."'" Hamilton was
charging that this statute, as amended, would itself violate the
guarantee of due process of law since such a guarantee presupposed a judicial proceeding. He commented: "Are we willing
then to endure the inconsistency of passing a bill of rights, and
committing a direct violation of it in the same session? In short,
are we ready to destroy its foundations at the moment they are
laid?" 3 As Professor Whitten observed:
Hamilton's meaning in this passage is unmistakable. He
first interprets "law of land" as requiring presentment and indictment, etc. Then he interprets "due process of law" as requiring a judicial proceeding before anyone can be deprived of
a right. In other words, the Senate amendment depriving owners of privateers of the right to hold positions of trust within
the state would violate the "Act concerning the Rights of the
Citizens of this State," because it would directly deprive the
shipowners of their rights without a judicial proceeding-i.e.,
without due process of law. This is why the words "due process
of law," in his view, could "never be referred to an Act of the
legislature": because an act of the legislature could not satisfy
41. R. Whitten, supra note 7, Part II, at 34.
42. 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 40, at 35 (emphasis in

original).
43. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
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the requirement of due process of law and was thus a violation
of provisions that required due process-i.e., judicial
proceedings.
As a whole, the preconstitutional materials confirm the
English meaning of "due process of law." With few exceptions,
the "law of the land" phrases of the state constitutions are
joined with "judgment of his peers" language by the conjunction "or," suggesting Coke's influence. This influence is expressed in the remarks of Alexander Hamilton; and Hamilton's
statements also equate due process of law with a requirement
of judicial proceedings before an individual might be deprived
of his rights. Due process as a limit on the legislative power is
also clear from Hamilton's statements.44
Now Berger's arguably erroneous interpretation of due process of law clearly does not undercut his basic thesis, but only
changes the limited meaning that the term "due process" was
intended to have and requires some restrictions on legislative actions that differ greatly from the previous "substantive due process" inventions of the Supreme Court.
Similarly, when I remarked upon this different weight to be
ascribed to different kinds of legislative history,45 Berger asserted
that I was being "over-refined and redundant."4 6 Actually, I was
adverting to facts in the adoptive history of the fourteenth
amendment that would strengthen Berger's case, but which I feel
he failed to exploit. To illustrate, assume one is at a meeting,

44. R. Whitten, supra note 7, Part II, at 35-36. It is certainly true that such a "due
process" limitation on legislative action was not customarily resorted to in challenging
the validity of a statute during a judicial proceeding. As Hamilton's remarks strongly
suggest, however, there is evidence that, as a matter of constitutional principle, such
restraints or limitations were believed to inhere in the "due process"-type guarantee contained in many state constitutions. See In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293 (Ala. 1838); Saco v.
Wentworth, 37 Me. 165 (1853); Regents of the Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365
(Md. 1838); Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. (7 Cool.) 113 (1863). That this principle was not
a commonly used device for challenging legislation could in fact reflect the infrequency of
any arguable violation of it by a legislative body, perhaps because the nature of the guarantee was so well understood and seriously regarded that legislative restraint in matters
possibly offensive to a "law of the land" or "due process" guarantee was the norm. In any
case, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that Hamilton's remarks actually demonstrate
an understanding or opinion that such restraints or legislative action would be entirely
conceivable, rather than meaning that they would be impossible. If a legislature was to
violate such a guarantee in the manner described by Hamilton, what remedy, one may
ask, would an aggrieved party have?
45. Bridwell, supra note 16, at 913 n.32.
46. Berger, supra note 10, at 174 n.21.
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say a faculty meeting, at which a particular measure is being
voted on. Some colleague stands and makes comments on what
he feels the measure means or will accomplish. The fact that one
disagrees with the pre-adoption interpretation of it will not prevent a vote to adopt the measure since one is not absolutely
bound to any given, arguably debatable construction of something subject to differing interpretations. 'Assume the speaker
claims the term "equal protection" used in a proposed measure
that would guarantee everyone "equal protection of the law"
means that no one is actually guaranteed equal access to stateprovided education. But contrast a situation in which this same
member offers an amendment to the proposed measure that clarifies it to provide that "equal protection shall be taken to include
a right to equal access to all state-financed education which no
state shall abridge in any way," and the Measure is soundly defeated. What may we say about these two examples of legislative
history as demonstrating whether a guarantee touching the subject of education is included in the measure finally adopted that
speaks only of "equal protection" generally? I would say that the
explicit exclusion of specific guarantees by vote of the assembly
formulating the constitutional article is worth more than one or
more statements by the drafters of what it means. One or more
interpretations that it does not mean a particular thing are to
me less convincing than a vote by the adopting body that it does
not. We know that the latter process occurred in connection with
the fourteenth amendment." Again, my comments on this score
really do not detract from the critical issues to be dealt with
here, but I must underscore the utility of making such distinctions in analyzing the "intent" behind any given constitutional
or legislative measure.
I also feel Professor Berger has not adequately dealt with the
general question of judicial authority in American legal history,
which comprehends much private-law activity as well as publiclaw decisionmaking. For example, he seems content to approvingly cite a theory of private-law decisionmaking that is at odds
with some of his basic tenets concerning the prevailing concept
of judicial restraint in our early national history. He adopts the
theory espoused by Morton Horwitz, 8 that "[buy a variety of

47. Bridwell, supra note 16, at 913 n.32.
48. See M. HoRwrrz, THE TRASFORMATION OF AMERCN LAw, 1780-1860 (1977). See
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mechanisms the law was then adapted to legitimate and facilitate the inequalities of the nineteenth-century market economy
in which the entrepreneurs flourished and the weak suffered."4
Berger also isolates a pre-eminent example of "unconstitutional"
judicial action of that period"0 -the Supreme Court's opinion in
Swift v. Tyson 5' -and lauds the Court's belated reversal of this
alleged usurpation nearly a century later 2 to demonstrate that a
lapse of time does not justify suffering an unconstitutional act to
continue.
The problem is his uncritical acceptance of such a thesis
when a small facet of it taken out of context appears to support
his views. In many ways the Horwitz thesis contradicts Berger's
views. It relies heavily upon isolated evidence lifted out of context and selected for its compatability with a relatively subjective, motivational preconception about judicial decisionmaking,
in which a massive effort to suppress the economically deprived
and to support the entrepreneur becomes the central explanation
for judicial action. Berger's thesis, if I am able to correctly generalso R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 308, 321-22.
49. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. Cm. L. REV.
533 (1979). "Nevertheless, a free and easy judicial approach to constitutional 'adaptation'
derived in no small part from the freedom American courts assumed in the early nineteenth century to reshape the common law for the benefit of an emerging entreprenurial
system." R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 321. "'Instrumentalism' describes the approach
derived from early nineteenth century common law practice.
... Id. at 322. "'Instrumentalism,' Horwitz shows, largely began to develop in the early nineteenth century
." Id. at 308.

Berger repeatedly employs the Horwitz approach to private-law decisionmaking, although he clearly does so to distinguish this area from questions of statutory and constitutional interpretation so as to underscore the novel nature of applying this "free-wheeling" approach to institutional interpretation in recent times. Id. He thus adopts the
Horwitz interpretation to contrast it with what he correctly describes as the traditional
approach in the public-law area, and to strengthen his argument that recent Supreme
Court decisions take revolutionary liberties with the intent of the framers of constitutional provisions. My argument is that the employment of the Horwitz theory about "instrumental" private-law activity really detracts from, rather than supports, his case
against extravagant judicial powers.
50. Berger, supra note 15, at 544-45.
51. 42 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Berger only states that the Supreme Court expressed
the view that Swift was unconstitutional, and renders no opinion on the case itself or the
correctness of its overruling. He thus seeks only to illustrate the former practice of overruling a decision found to be in error, despite the lapse of time. However, it is clear that
Berger generally adopts the Horwitz thesis approvingly, see note 49 supra, and it is this
that I find detrimental to his position.
52. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See R. BERGER, supra note 13, at 297
n.56, 410 n.11.
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alize about it, posits some intellectual structure of principles, the
honest pursuit of which contributes to the autonomy of the law.
But Berger does not even attempt to assess whether Professor
Horwitz's one-note theory actually captures the legal history of
the early national period. Nor does Berger attempt to discern the
degree to which such an intellectual structure sufficiently shared
by lawyers and judges contributed to the Vitality and neutrality
of legal rules, even in the private-law area, despite social or economic forces. I feel that the Horwitz thesis, like much of the
popular constitutional law literature, is calculated to support
and promote a prevalent social, economic, and political bias, but
will not withstand the test of time. It already has come under
sharp attack,53 and its "oversimplified" 5 explanation of our judicial history is a poor companion piece to Berger's radically different emphasis on constitutionalism and the rule of law as opposed
to that of "caste or class."55
The precise reasons why such a different approach to judicial authority allegedly prevailed in different legal areas should
be explored. I am convinced that a close look at judicial action
in the private-law area demonstrates a much more restrained approach to the formulation of new doctrine than is expressed in
the "instrumentalist" clich6. The nature of restraints on judicial
private-law decisionmaking would, if properly appreciated, do
more to strengthen Berger's characterization of our tradition of
limited judicial power than his acceptance of the popular view of
extremely broad private-law powers wielded by the early nineteenth century courts. This comment, however, is designed
merely to encourage a broader comparative analysis of all early
judicial action as a predicate for evaluating the work of the modern Supreme Court; it does not detract from Berger's more limited arguments against particular decisions that they have made,
and his basic thesis about the binding effect of clearly expressed
intent contained in the Constitution. With these personal reser63. E.g., Simpson, supra note 49. "Through an unsatisfactory and loose use of evidence, he has made a complex, confused story fall into a preordained pattern." Id. at
600. See also Bridwell, Theme v. Reality in American Legal History: A Commentary on
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, and on the Common Law in
America, 53 IND. L.J. 449 (1978). "'Intellectual history' of this sort necessarily employs
arbitrarily selected evidence judged by its superficial conformity to a 'theme' rather than

its relationship to elements in a real context." Id. at 493.
54. Simpson, supra note 49, at 600.
55. Bridwell, supra note 53, at 496.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss4/3

14

1980]
REVIEW
Bridwell: The Scope of JudicialJuDICt
Review: A Dirge
for the Theorists of Majori

vations aside, the central thesis of Berger's work should be addressed along with the comments of his critics.
III.

THE AcADEMc RESPONSE

Surely Berger's thesis is a proposition of constitutional law
sufficiently fundamental and important to call for an answer.
And the answer to Berger's basic question (can the Court contradict clearly expressed intent?) from academe has been a somewhat tentative, seldom straightforward, and mysteriously convoluted "yes." The significance of this question is quite obvious,"6
and stems from the "almost universally accepted importance of
consent as a prerequisite of valid and binding rules of constitutional (or other) laws-because of the primacy of democratic theory in our constitutional scheme.

'5

If it is possible to have judi-

cial decrees supersede the most fundamental expression of
consent in our system, it is vital to know precisely how this authority came about, why the judiciary is believed to possess it,
and what conditions there are, if any, to its exercise.
On the questions of the existence of and justification for this
power, the views of the majority of commentators are remarkably alike, as are the views expressed in the Hastings symposium.
Many of the differences are clearly attributable to stylistic and
rhetorical preferences rather than substance. Professor Lusky's
contribution s is typical of the positions taken in the remainder
of the essays, as well as of the "yes" answers to our seminal
question in the scholarship generally. In fact, Professor Lusky's
attempts to justify this form of judicial action provide an almost
comprehensive litany of the rationale of pro-activist scholarship;
thus, the basic features of his essay are noteworthy. Professor
56. Berger quotes Professor Philip Kurland as describing the issue as "the most immediate constitutional crisis of our present time, the usurpation of general governmental
powers on the pretext that its authority derives from the Fourteenth Amendment." Berger, supra note 15, at 527 (quoting letter from Philip Kurland to Harvard University
Press (August 15, 1977)) (letter appears, in pertinent part, on book jacket of R. BRGEoR,
GovERNMENT BY JuDiciARY: Tim TRANsFoRMATIoN OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

(1977)).

Professor Kurland has elsewhere described the notion that many of the values the Court
imposes in the decisions actually derive from the Constitution as "arrant nonsense."
Kurland, Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 8.
57. Bridwell, supra note 11, at 468. See also Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism: Its
Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 411 (1979).
58. Lusky, "Government by Judiciary": What Price Legitimacy?, 6 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 403 (1979).
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Lusky's "yes" answer is constructed against the background of
certain unsupported assertions about the patently "inadequate" 9 nature of a more limited form of judicial authority, and
identifies the acceptance of older, "inadequate" theories with a
now outmoded form of legal training."0 Some homage is paid to
democratic theory with yet another assertion that a limited view
of judicial authority resting on precise constitutional content is
no longer "acceptable to the American people"; 6 in fact, Lusky
further asserts that the new constitutional revisory power enjoyed by the judiciary has been somehow harmonized with democracy since "the people at large have accepted the legitimacy
"562
of the basic decisions claiming enlarged judicial power ....
Yet, these observations are clearly peripheral to Lusky's basic
thesis that seeks to legitimize the extensive judicial power addressed in our basic question. His primary justification is twopronged. First, the notion that the new judicial authority is an
accomplished fact resulting from judicial assertion-arising from
a recent "seismic" change 3 in the Court's impression of its own
powers-of the power to revise the Constitution and repudiation
of the older limits on judicial review. The Court thus adopted a
"new and grander conception of its own place in the governmental scheme." 4 In other words, the Court's claim to the power is a
fait accompli; it is unrealistic to presume it reversible.6 5 Second,
and most typically and significantly, the assertion of correctness
of the results reached by the newly claimed judicial power is tantamount to a demonstration of their legitimacy. The "practical
59. Id. at 403.
60. Id. at 405-06.
61. Id. at 405. Professor Lusky, however, does not share with us the important empirical research that I assume he possesses and upon which he bases his firm and precise
statements about what "the people" have accepted or rejected.
62. Id. at 413. However, elsewhere Lusky refers to current prejudice against minorities that "most people can discern simply by examining their own attitudes." Id. at 422.
How the Court made decisions, in fact was "driven" to make decisions, that "people at
large have accepted" but which, oddly, run counter to deep-seated prejudices that have
to be overridden by these juicial decisions, is quite interesting. As Professor Kurland has
observed, "Many, if not most, lawyers, certainly those in academia, in government, and
on the federal benches, make claims to greater insights about the social condition than
even the greatest of philosophers, economists, sociologists, and political theorists." Kurland, supra note 56, at 5.
63. See Lusky, supra note 58, at 407.
64. Id. at 408.
65. Id. at 407-08. Unlike Shakespeare's Henry IV, the Supreme Court is willing to
claim the throne by conquest.
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effect"6 of a more restrictive view is underscored, and "the value
of the Court's work over the last four decades" 67 is emphasized,
in an attempt to demonstrate "the immensity of the stakes""
involved in the choice between limited and unlimited judicial review. A certain "moral authority"" thus enables the Court to exercise the power, and the entire thrust of this essentially pure
result orientation rests upon certain a priori assumptions about
the correctness of particular "national commitments."7 To be
sure, Professor Lusky would declare that he is not really for "un-

limited" judicial revisory power. In fact, he gently rebukes Lawrence Tribe for rationalizing the C6urt's opinions in a way that
really accepts all the Court's rulings as legitimate. Yet, for all
his equation of the "seismic" change in self-proclaimed judicial
authority wth pure physical science, calculated to drive home its
inevitability,7 ' Professor Lusky's "limiting" principles are purely
admonitory directions to the Court to exercise "self-restraint"
and to give "reasons for claiming to be the final word on constitutional questions .
*...
-2 Those directions fail utterly to provide any meaningful or intelligible guide to either limiting judicial authority, or to answering the fundamental questions of political democracy which such authority implicates." For all its

66. Id. at 410.
67. Id. at 413.
68. Id. at 432.
69. Id. at 433.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 406-08, 409.
72. Id. at 435.
73. Id. In his 1975 book, Professor Lusky outlined his basic thesis that the Supreme
Court possesses some sort of power delegated to it by the framers to serve as some kind of
ongoing constitutional convention to update the Constitution. L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIHr?
A CoMMENTARY ON THE SUPmE COURT'S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION (1975). See
Berger, supra note 15, at 534. Why the framers never explicitly mentioned such an important power, let alone put it in the Constitution, is itself an interesting historical question. It is all the more interesting when one considers the many well-known statements of
the framers that would support the exact opposite of this awesome judicial power.
The nature of this "moral authority," Lusky, supra note 58, at 433, that the Court
allegedly possesses to "resolve deeply devisive conflicts," id., in our society is also interesting. It is an authority which "does not appertain to the Justices individually," for they
are "mere non-elected individuals." Id. Yet, these same justices collectively can under
Lusky's theory, clearly revise the Constitution and discard the popular will it represents.
How a collection of individually powerless individuals can combine to achieve this is
intriguing. Constitutional law is a fascinating subject.
The inclination to rely upon merely admonitory restraints or purely personal qualities pertaining to government officials as a sufficient limitation on their authority is not
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rhetorical nicety and for all the admitted attractiveness of some
of the particular policies the Court has implemented in its controversial decisions, what Professor Lusky actually articulates as
a test for judicial authority is nothing more than a ratification of
an accomplished unilateral judicial claim to power, an acceptance of it as a real-world inevitability as inexorable as the laws
of physics, coupled with a commendation of the results of judinew. Professor Lusky is but one example of the current advocacy of this type of constitutional limitation. Others emphasize as a more important functional restraint on power
than the consent of those governed selection of who possess-what is called for scrtiny-"indisputable professional and personal merit and integrity." Abraham, "Equal
Justice Under Law" or "Justice at any Cost"? The Judicial Role Revisited: Reflections
on Government by Judiciary: The Transformationof the FourteenthAmendment, 6 I-us'INGS CONST. L.Q. 467, 483 (1979).
Although emphasis on some hard rules deprives the Court of power to do the good
deeds it desires and could do if checked only by an admonitioA to be restrained, to give
life to the "spirit" of the Constitution, or to have "integrity," this approach certainly was
not one that figured very largely during the period in which our Constitution was drafted.
For example, consider Patrick Henry's comments to the Virginia ratifying convention:
Where are your checks in this government? Your strongholds will be in the
hands of your enemies. It is on a supposition that your American govemors
shall be honest, that all the good qualities of this government are founded; but
its defective and imperfect construction puts it in their powers to perpetuate
the worst of mischiefs, should they be bad men; and, sir, would not all the
world, from the eastern to the western hemisphere, blame our distracted folly
in resting our rights upon the contingency of our rulers being good or bad?
Show me that age and country where the rights and liberties of the people were
placed on the sole chance of their rulers being good men, without a consequent
loss of liberty! I say that the loss of that dearest privilege has ever followed,
with absolute certainty, every such mad attempt.
3 THE DEBATES INTHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN1787, at 59 (J.
Elliott ed. 1907). Indeed, it was these fears which, in fact, prompted the creation of the
first ten amendments to the Constitution, to insure that Henry's characterization of the
government resulting from the Constitution would not prove correct. Others, too, echoed
the focus on principle rather than confidence as essential to the constitutional scheme. As
Jefferson observed:
[c]onfidence is everywhere the parent of despotism-free government is
founded in jealousy, and not in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence
which prescribes limited constitutions, to bind down those whom we are
obliged to trust with power: that our Constitution has accordingly fixed the
limits to which, and no further, our confidence may go ....
17 THE WRITINGS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 388-89 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds. 1904) [hereinafter cited as JEFFERSON W=rrINoS]. No one would disagree with Professor Abraham
that we should search for judges with merit and integrity. When the emphasis on his goal
is coupled with statements about judicial authority that endorse the judicial contradiction of express intent in the Constitution, one must note that this approach is not that of
our traditional constitutionalism, and fits more comfortably with the constitutional
revolution of recent decades than with that of 1787-1789.
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cial action. Reduced to a fundamental axiom of constitutional
law, despite whatever unexpressed intent or privately held qualification Lusky might have, the "test" he actually employs identifies what the Court has done with what it can constitutionally
do; he then declares-in an amazingly simple and straightforward manner-that "what is" is correct and accords with his impression of the historically inevitable, and should be supported
because of the results it has attained. The important consideration is, however, that regardless of the soundness of Professor
Lusky's histiography (what fait accompli cannot be asserted to
be, by definition, a product of the "pressure" of inexorable historical forces?), he fails to address the basic constitutional question of majority rule. This is a serious flaw for a theory that
seeks to legitimize judicial power that is arguendo contrary to
clear intent contained in the Constitution, and we are still left
with a host of unanswered questions.
With respect to his primary result orientation, Professor
Lusky's essay squarely represents the cardinal principle of legitimacy according to modem scholarly standards. These standards,
more than anything, involve a basic apology for judicial action
based on the acceptability of results. The fact of judicial author-74
ity claimed and exercised, if accompanied by laudable results,
74. When "the price" of legitimacy could threaten particular results, it is found to
be too high. See Lusky, supra note 58, at 435. One of the basic flaws in Berger's work,
according to Lusky, is that he does not really appreciate the "value of the Court's work
over the last four decades . . .," id. at 413, that is, the results the Court has produced.
Even here, some homage is paid to the framers with the assertion that they would really
have wanted things to be the way they turned out "had they been living and acting in
the middle of the 20th century." Id. What would these same people have wanted with
respect to the protections offered by the fourth amendment, I wonder; would surmise
about this question be an adequate basis for allowing warrantless ex parte searches for a
home to fight unprecedented crime? This conjectural time-transposition theory has many
possibilities. Lusky seems to envision that transmutation of the fourth amendment is
possible too, if needed, arguing that
[a]t the risk of seeming needlessly alarmist I say that though they lack the
numbers and military strength to mount an armed revolt, nonwhites are fully
capable of creating such civil disorder that wholesale searches, arrests without
probable cause, official censorship, and other police state trappings would be
thought essential for societal survival here, as they were in Italy during the
spring of 1978 when Aldo Moro was kidnaped and killed.
Id. If the matter is mainly a question of estimating the propensity for violence or even the
political strength of contending factions in order to decide which constitutional provision
to ignore, why not? Lusky here suggests so much detachment from the independent
principles in the Constitution, entrusted to the judiciary for even-handed enforcement,
that he regards the supposed guarantees in the Constitution as optional and dispensable
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is assumed to be dispositive of the issue of legitimacy, and despite Lusky's attempts to distinguish himself from Professor
Tribe,75 his position simply results from a slightly different
choice in the line-drawing process produced by purely discretionary result oriented standards, standards that simply do not elucidate the source or nature of pretended judicial authority to
override clearly discernible intent. A narrative or purely descriptive account of the Court's self-perception and altered claims to
authority de facto, and the measurement of results, are the keystones of legitimacy. A clearer invitation to judicial revision of
the Constitution-hedged by admonition to be shrewd and restrained-and guided by the educated consensus of academe
could not be found. However much Lusky might wish to preserve
the impression that he is dealing with constitutional principles
as distinguished from results, or appear to provide more than a
well-written but simple apology for judicial fiat that transcends
the basic issue of majoritarianism, that is not what he has done.
I cannot divine his motives, but respectfully suggest the fact of
what he has written is there for all to read, and I have described
its functional qualities here with accuracy.
The remaining essays in the symposium are mainly variations on the basic apologetic theme with some deviations, both
in the direction of somewhat greater restraint than the Lusky approach, and in the direction of an even more fervent commitment to result orientation and unlimited judicial authority. Professor Wallace Mendelson, for example, delivers some very blunt
criticism of the activist camp and comes closer than any other
symposium contributor to agreeing with Berger's construction of
the fourteenth amendment; Mendelson, however, finds the
meaning ascribed particularly to the privileges and immunities
clause less clear than Berger.76 Berger provides a lengthy and asin the face of any emergency. This is, of course, compatible with his vision of judicial
authority. But one cannot help wonder whether the Constitution was designed to and
should offer a bit more reliable and durable protection for the individual than it seems to
be able to under the omnipotent judiciary. My personal reaction to the hypothetical
threat to society posed by a minority demanding exemption from majority rule would be
that the minority members would still be entitled to their constitutional guarantees-those of the fourth, the sixth, the eighth, or any other amendment, and I would
reject an appeal to my hypothetical willingness to abandon some part of the Constitution
later under stress, as a basis for encouraging abandonment of another part of it now.
75. Id. at 416-18.
76. Mendelson, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment-Abuse by Contraction vs.
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tute rebuttal to this position in his comments on Mendelson's
paper." The basic idea from our point of view is that the BergerMendelson conflict is over the content of the relevant constitutional provision, that is, the intent. Mendelson does not openly
disagree with Berger over the effect of that intent, if it is admittedly clear and appears, at least implicitly, to resolve the
majoritarian dilemma posed by unlimited judicial review the
same way as Berger does. Mendelson labels "j]udicial edicts derived from standards not discernible in statute or Constitution"
as "government by judges," s a form of government that he does
not believe the Constitution envisioned. Professor Henry J.
Abraham's contribution 9 also seems to break with the Lusky approach by recognizing that the basic issue in the debate "is not a
question of judicial institutional capacity, it is rather one of judicial constitutional legitimacy,"" and by agreeing with Berger
that the Court has usurped power in its recent decisions." Abraham agrees that the judiciary should not engage in legislation
since the legislative branch "is the keystone of the arch of representative democracy, 82 but disappointedly concludes that as a
general proposition there is no test that one can apply to draw
the line between legislative and judicial action.1 He then falls
back upon a vague test reminiscent of Lusky's personal admonition to right-thinking judges, declares that "identifying institutional role commitments"84 and finding "meritorious" ' , personnel
to fill the courts is the answer, and dismisses rather casually the
overwhelming evidence that the result orientation of modern
constitutional theory has converted any test for "merits" into a
purely ideological litmus with greater emphasis on "representaAbuse by Expansion, 6 HASTNGS CONsT. L.Q. 437, 446-51 (1979).
77. Berger, supra note 15, at 551-58.
78. Mendelson, supra note 76, at 445. I will not discuss Mr. Cerny's contribution,
since it concerns the reaction of the press to the proposed fourteenth amendment, rather
than directly bearing on the central issue of the effect of clearly discernible intent. See
generally Cerny, Appendix to the Opinion of the Court, 6 HAsINGS CONsT. L.Q. 455
(1979).
79. Abraham, supra note 73.
80. Id. at 470 (emphasis in original).
81. Id. at 472-73.
82. Id. at 473.
83. Id. at 481.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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tional" considerations than on competence. 6 Incredibly, Abraham proposes a test for judicial authority calling upon the
"spirit" of any particular constitutional provision, and strongly
suggests that invocation of this spirit can, in fact, justify judicial
contradiction of express intent;8" this is defensible in connection
with the fourteenth amendment basically because, true to the
fundamental credo of result orientation, to have done otherwise
would "have perpetuated injustice."s Although Abraham decries
judicial legislation on the one hand, he also apparently endorses
it on the other. 9 Thus, solutions proposed by Abraham and
Mendelson, like those of Lusky, make only theoretical protesta86. Id. at 485.
87. Id. at 478-79.
88. Id. at 480.
89. The issue of majority rule or consent is thus not adequately resolved. Because of
Abraham's vagueness in describing the judicial role and his unwillingness to analyze and
to address directly the issue of intent vs. judicial review, one is left with his suggestion
that judicial power can transcend majority will in the pursuit of some "spirit" contained
in the Constitution that is more important than specific intent. This approach is always
advocated in connection with the Court's efforts to protect minorities, and the first
Brown decision is virtually always the centerpiece of the favored, though suspect, judicial
activism. See id. It is, however, important to note that the protection of minorities permitted or required by the Constitution is itself a product of majority decisions, and not
simply some overriding "just" principle that the judiciary is charged with enforcing,
without regard to whatever else the Constitution might say. At least this has been the
traditional viewpoint, as it has to be, if the principle of democratic government is to
continue. It is the majority itself that must be viewed as the source of minority protection
against what Jefferson called "an elective despotism." 2 JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra
note 73, at 163. As Jefferson remarked:
All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the
majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable,
that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect,
and to violate which to would be oppression.
3 JEFFERSON WRrrINGS, supra note 73, at 318 (emphasis added).

There are some modem commentators who approach vindication of a minority as the
fundamental principle of constitutional law, somehow detaching the particular protection
that minorities enjoy from majority will altogether. See generally Bridwell, supra note 11,
at 477. If this were the fundamental principle, which of course it clearly is not, we should
require both a thorough account of the origins of this cardinal principle of constitutional
law and an account of how what Mr. Justice Stone called "the tyranny of minority" is
any better than "elective despotism." Kurland, supra note 56, at 19. For these theorists,
the first principle of majority rule, acknowledged as a basis for our 1789 Constitution, has
been replaced (by a "seismic" change?) by the first principle of minority rule through the
efforts of a judiciary whose claim to power is that it represents the latter day "surrogate"
of the original drafters. See L. LuSKY, supra note 73, at 21.
On the various methods of vindicating some general intent or purpose from the particular phraseology of a statute or other rule, see P. BREST, PaocEssEs OF CoNsTrONAL
DECiSIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERiALS

31-46 (1975).
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tions and gestures toward democratic theory but as a practical
matter justify judicial action by resort to some consensus about
injustice; this is incompatible with majority rule, past or present. The "line" Abraham seeks to draw is figured by the same
hip-shooting discretion, keyed to the academic barometer of
"just and unjust" results, and is thus, as written, a result-selective commentary rather than an analysis of constitutional
principle.
This schizophrenic attempt to equate results with legitimacy in particular instances, but to generally preserve majority
rule as an option, presumably as insurance against a Court disposed to injustice, is at best a considered gamble resting on
pragmatism rather than intellectually definable principle. -It is a
gamble that only those who are dissatisfied with majority rule,
with democracy, at least on some levels, ever decide to take.
Professor Arthur Miller 0 would probably wish to be
counted among those seeking not to "fall afoul of the democratic
principle of majority rule."9 But for Miller, the Court can change
the Constitution as justifiably as the people can amend it,92 and
he criticizes Berger's view as producing "law bound and tied by
stare decisis, whether or not well suited to contemporary
needs." 3 He thereby implicitly passes over the fundamental
matter of authority to determine "contemporary needs" by accepting the judiciary as the proper body to perform this function.
The Court, according to Miller, can clearly determine "what
overriding values" there are or should be,94 and he does not attempt to hide his conviction that "the Constitution does not require that cases be decided 'in accordance with the specific intentions of the framers even when those intentions are ascertainable.' ,9 Simplistically reducing judicial decisionmaking to an
election between the discernible but conflicting policies, he engages in the typical apologist's antipathy to judicial history,
which offers a rich and complex intellectual structure by which to
analyze and distinguish different degrees of judicial discretion
90. See generally Miller, The Elusive Search for Values in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1979).
91. Kurland, supra note 56, at 5.
92. Miller, supra note 90, at 488-89.
93. Id. at 489 n.12.
94. Id. at 497 (citing time-honored opinions such as Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) for support).
95. Miller, supra note 90, at 498 (quoting Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution
Mean What it Always Meant?, 77 CoLuM. L. REV. 1029, 1054 (1977)).
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and authority." Since judging is simply a "creative act, ' 97 the
Supreme Court-not to be confused with an "ordinary court of
law" 5 -is free to be perfectly result oriented, rather than confined to "a formula or a dogma [which] is intellectual
death."9 Miller comes as close as anyone I have seen in embracing an undiluted, perfectly non-democratic evaluation of judicial
power according to the result it promotes. He is fairly explicit
about the anti-majoritarian premise that what really limits
judicial power is what judges can get away with: "Their discretion

is in fact limited to that which the public will accept."'' 0 Ironically (but also typically), Miller in the same breath identifies
the Court's primary mission as promoting "the democratic
ideal,""0 ' though in practice "judicial thought should ultimately be in terms of consequences, of results and of alternative

decisions."'0 2 Although we have the usual exhortation to
judges "not to roam at will, 10°3 Professor Miller's constituted
theory, functionally and practically analyzed, espouses a judicially self-determined authority to overrule even clearly expressed popular will whenever the "authoritative faculty of social ethics,"'0 4 which our Supreme Court has become, so decides.
96. See generally R. BRmWELL & R. WHrrrEN, TaE CONSTIUMON AND THE COMMON
LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRmN OF SEPARAUON OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM (1977);
Bridwell, supra note 53, at 461-92; Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN.L. REV.801 (1978); Kommers, Role of the Supreme Court, 40 REv. OF POL. 409 (1978); Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 117 (1978).
97. Miller, supra note 90, at 498.
98. Id. at 499.
99. Id. at 501. From a purely formal point of view, Miller seems to feel that his
prescription for judicial action is definitely not dogma, whereas Berger's definitely is.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 505.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 501.
104. Id. at 504. It would be a challenge to redraft the original language of the 1789
Constitution to explicitly convey the meaning that writers such as Miller give to it. Perhaps doing so would dramatize the unbelievability of their occasional claims that their
views are really compatible with the 1789 document. Article III would begin:
The Judicial Power of the United States should be in one supreme and
"authoritative faculty of social ethics" who shall decide by majority vote "the
values that should be furthered in interpreting the Constitution," unfettered by
the unmistakable will of the majority to the contrary, and shall by majority
vote amend the Constitution whenever "contemporary needs" are decreed by it
to so require. Nothing in Article V, herein, shall affect the Supreme Court's
power as final arbiter of all law within the United States, but any Amendment
to this Constitution pursuant to Article V shall be advisory only.
At least this version of Article I has the virtue of rendering the specific content of all
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Whatever cautionary remarks that Professor Miller might make
as a gesture to the populace, they are nothing more than exhortations to pragmatism he gives to a supreme judicial authority
whose sole function is to produce results satisfactory to him, and
others of like mind. Concluding with the inevitable "ludicrously
pretentious jargon common place in this camp,""' Professor
Miller educates us that "[t]he Constitution is a politico-legal
palimpsest,''0 leaving us with the insight that nothing is ever
really unconstitutional, only some things are merely unpopular.
Aside from paraphrasing the "vacuum theory" that excuses
judicial action whenever "politically accountable legislators...
abdicate their proper policy roles,"'' 0 and that apparently excuses judicial action even if contrary to the popular will when
doing so would "respond to injustice," Professor Kutler's essay
adds absolutely nothing to the resolution of the critical questions
posed by Berger. Kutler pins expanded judicial power on
changed "conceptions of the judicial role"'08 and closes with the
same emphasis on results, adding no new elaboration to the
apologist theories of the other contributors.
other constitutional provisions unimportant.

105. Bridwell, supra note 11, at 471.
106. Miller, supra note 90, at 508.
107. Kutler, supra note 30, at 523. Professor Kutler does give a nice account of the
pre-1937 liberal chorus demanding principled decisionmaking tuned to the framers' intent and its metamorphosis to a chorus of support after the more activist era had begun.
Id. at 511-14. Most everyone was happy with the change and was willing to accept new
"conceptions of the judicial role," except some "Southern politicians molding political
careers through support for segregation .

. . ."

Id. at 514. Kutler orchestrates the whole

development essentially as a confrontation between politically incompatible forces.
Kutler's article would have been more satisfying if, without minimizing the result oriented efforts from both sides of the fence, he had reached the critical question of the
source and limits of judicial authority in a democratic system, rather than delivering so
many more platitudes about the "realities of governmental and social processes," id. at
516, the identification of ultimate limits on the judiciary as what "society tolerates in the
search for new values," id. at 523, and the need for "sensitive appreciation of either our
institutional dilemma or our political and social realities," id. at 526.
No one has any trouble believing that the judiciary could mandate a state of affairs
against which the people would finally revolt, or believing that many people do not honestly ponder constitutional principle or governmental structure so much as the results
they desire. But all this is really beside the point, at best, collateral to the central issue
Berger addresses: how the Constitution is designed to work and how it is to be formally
changed. That the Supreme Court, or "the people" for that matter, could overthrow the
process that the Constitution was intended to entail does not affect how it should operate. Certainly this must be at least a factor in our evaluation of constitutional change.
108. Id. at 513.
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THE MAJOR PROBLEMS WrrH THE NEW SCHOOL

Before elaborating on the various characteristics of the Hastings essays challenging Berger's thesis, I will emphasize clearly
the way in which they all involve but do not solve-save by bare
assertion-the most basic constitutional problem that has
emerged in the field: the manner in which the newly articulated
tests to measure the limits of judicial authority are often clearly
incompatible with a previously viable constitutional first principle, i.e., the commitment to consent as a basis for government
and to an ultimate resort to popular or majority will for law.
This essential deviation from a commitment to majoritarianism,
the indulgence in the luxury of "elective" or "sometime" democracy, depending on the issue, raises the most basic political and
constitutional problems articulated by Berger. I should again
emphasize that the results of many of the Court's actions are
undoubtedly attractive. My narrow purpose here, however, is to
underscore the future risks in a system of constitutional analysis
which so willingly softens and euphemizes notions of constitutional principle when the tide of results is favorable. We may
begin to think with Patricia Harris that results, power, and legitimacy are basically the same. Why a bad outcome in a particular case is an important "practical effect""1 ' to be considered in
109. Lusky, supra note 58, at 410. An authority equally respectable has explicitly
disagreed with the notion advanced by Miller that "[a]mendment is not the only way the
document can be changed," Miller, supra note 90, at 488, and with Professor Lusky's
assertion that the value of achieving immediate goals outweighs the long-term risk of
expanded judicial authority that must be conceded to achieve those goals. George Washington, for example, admonished:
If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment
in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by
usurpation; for, though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it
is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.
Washington, Farewell Address, in WASHINGTON'S F wEwnLLADDRESS AND WEBSTR'S
BUNKER HmL ORATIONS 18 (W.Peck ed. 1918).
Professor Berger's approach has been characterized as "the naive style" by one commentator. Soifer, supra note 11, at 1281 n.3. Was Washington "naive" also? I am not sure
I want the Supreme Court to be the modern "surrogate" empowered to perpetuate the
political philosophy of naive people, assuming that the other framers were as "naive" as
Washington.
Even if one accepts arguendo Lusky's assertion that the framers "intended" the
Court to do this, is it not at least as likely that the framers would, had they lived in the
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constitutional analysis, but a concession to selective anti-democratic judicial rule is not, is a mystery to me, save for the human
inclination to perceive and respond to obvious costs and consequences more readily than remote or subtle ones. I find it hard to
believe that anything other than pure result orientation can explain a collection of constitutional commentary which, in every
express, articulated description of judicial power, can be applied
to every litigated constitutional question to achieve results that
are the exact opposite of those actually reached.
This, to me, underscores the risk in ratifying judicial over
popular will. What is to happen if the Court decides in effect to
eliminate the fourteenth amendment or to ratify "separate but
equal" education? What can be said of the Constitution, but
that the Court has undergone another "seismic" change," ' another "shift" in self-perception, and has achieved "a new and
grander conception of its own place in the governmental
scheme.""' Indeed, what could be said of Richard Nixon, but
that he did likewise. That he violated the law? But that is what
Berger has to my mind proven that the Supreme Court has done,
if the Constitution ranks as law. Besides, what is the law that
Nixon ignored but the will of the populace, to be set aside when
new inspirations overtake us? What can be said but that the representative branches of government have been "unable" or "unwilling" to act ' 2 -:and with respect to some of these issues this
result might in fact (rather than in academic conjecture) accord
with popular will as it now stands, although not as expressed in
the disputed constitutional provision. What can be said but that
we have another vindication of "conventional morality"' 3 by the
Court, and that again we have escaped the grasp of the "dead
hand""' 4 of the distant, or recent past? What can be said but
twentieth century, have continued to espouse values that they explicitly praised as
enduring, such as majority rule, the limited judiciary, and the sanctity of the Article V
process for amendment, as opposed to embracing the exact opposite of those notions?
Since "tests" for authority such as those advocated by Lusky or Miller are based upon,
and in fact require such estimates, this is a fair question. Any fundamental "best evidence" rule to which one could resort requires an answer to it, not a mere assertion.
110. Lusky, supra note 58, at 407.
111. Id. at 408.
112. Id. at 417; see KutleF, supra note 30, at 524-25.
113. Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on The Supreme Court's Role

in American Government, 66 GEo. L.J. 1191, 1202 (1978).
114. Sobran, Taking the Fourteenth, 30 NAT'L Rzv. 283, 284 (1978). Of all the contributors to the symposium, Professor Miller seems the most anxious to escape this grasp.
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that the "spirit" of the Constitution has prevailed over "excessive literalism"? Will adjudication to vindicate the "spirit" of a
provision preclude resurrection of what was in fact the original
intent? Will some academic counselor tell us that the "spirit"
comprehends everything but what was intended? Perhaps it is
unlikely that the Court will decide such things, but is the standard for judicial authority a mere calculation of the probabilities
of judicial action? Is the limit to their authority, then, simply
defined by what they can get away with? The fact that Berger
has suggested such an unappealing intellectual basis for the proactivists, and that their "tests" for judicial authority functionally approximate this standard, is probably one reason why the
reaction to him seems so universal and "splenetic.""'
To me it seems safe to say that some analytical structure
that ties judicial action to "intent" or constitutional "meaning,"
whenever this can be ascertained, is the only way to make sense
out of a democratic constitution. The overt declaration that judicial power stands above known intent is an assertion that is difficult to comprehend from the perspective of a democratic lawmaking process. One may, of course, counter that intent cannot
be perfectly known. Let us consider this objection on several
levels. This assertion cannot be taken in the extreme sense, as
denying all possibility of useful communication. If you have a
discussion with a friend, does the fact that you cannot tell with
perfection what he means indicate that nothing is being communicated? Some common understanding, useful to both parties,
obviously results. How, then, do we extract this useful core of
intent from the various provisions of our Constitution? For example, when Congress proposes certain words that the states ratify, might the variations in intent among the drafters and among
the states be so great that the search for intent is fictional and
without purpose? It serves a purpose because without some analytical apparatus to impose limits and principles formulated in
the constitution-making or amendment process upon the judiciary, even if those limits and principles are plagued by occasional
ambiguities, then the democratic process certainly fails. Rather
than moving within the universe of an intellectual and analytical
Yet he fails to address one of our most outstanding modem rhetorical questions, "May
we thrust aside the dead hand of Earl Warren?" Id.
115. Berger, supra note 10, at 171.
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dialogue, we would simply be awaiting the final decree of the
judge. We would, moreover, never make progress toward more
effectual and useful constitutional declarations of majority will.
What difference would this effort make?
Ascertaining intent is also not really a fictional endeavor.
What, then, about the opinion of a drafter or congressman who
approves particular language but who assigns a different meaning to the language than that which the majority assumed?
What about the small number of state legislatures that attach a
different meaning to a proposed amendment that is assigned to
it by the majority of the requisite number of ratifying states?
Professor Ralph Whitten has addressed the problem of defining
intent from the consensus rendered in the amendment process,
although his entire thesis is much beyond the scope of our .inquiry here. On the question of the intent properly attributed to
the drafters and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment, Professor
Whitten has observed:
As we will see, however, the states took different views on
due process of law as applied to particular issues, including jurisdiction. What do we conclude about the original meaning
when the ratifying institutions apparently undertood it in different ways? Again, the only plausible course of action is to assume the predominant understanding of the language was what
the states approved. At first sight this appears unfair to the
states holding the "minority view" on an issue, because their
approval may have been essential to adoption and yet their
view of what limits on state authority were being approved differed from that of the "majority states." For example, suppose
most states saw "due process of law" as a limit upon the legislative authority as well as the judicial, while the "minority"
jurisdictions viewed it as only limiting judicial power. Would it
not be unfair to conclude that the phrase limited legislative authority, especially if the approval of the minority states was essential to ratification? The answer here seems, as a matter of
common sense, to be that it is not unfair. Although it would be
improper to allow a "special" or "secret" meaning to control
the interpretation of a constitutional provision, interpreting it
in accordance with the generally understood meaning among
all the ratifying bodies presents no problem. As a matter of
general understanding, we know that the states are usually
aware when they are in the majority or minority on a certain
issue. This was certainly true of the states' interpretation of the
phrase "due process of law." Thus a minority jurisdiction can
Published by Scholar Commons, 1980
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hardly complain that it thought it was ratifying language
whose meaning would be generally determined by the application of the minority state's "special" domestic significance.
Even if, in an isolated case, a state is "deceived" about the
meaning of a provision, because it looks to its own interpretation of the language rather than the general one, it cannot
justly complain; for it is unreasonable for it to assume that
such a special meaning will control in contravention to the accepted meaning generally. Again, this is a "common sense" approach, which individuals themselves employ in their day-today communications. One would hardly use a word or phrase
intentionally with a "special" meaning, without explaining
that meaning, if he wishes the audience to whom the communication is addressed to understand it and act properly on it. If
such a "special" meaning is employed contrary to the general
understanding of the words used among the audience addressed, then the communicator must expect that the audience
will act, not upon that meaning, but upon their general understanding of what is being said. Similarly, if the communicator
uses language in its generally accepted sense, it is not appropriate for an individual member of the audience to assume a special, personal meaning of the language and act upon it.
In the case of individual communications, as with constitutional clauses, problems of ambiguity or vagueness arise to
frustrate the "intent" of speakers, writers, and framers. In individual cases, such problems can often be worked out through
an interchange in which the communicator and audience arrive
at an extended meaning of language that does not, on first attempt, result in the proper reference. The process of constitutional modification is, unfortunately, not this flexible. Once a
constitutional provision is ratified, it is too late for its framers
to protest that the language used is being generally understood
in a sense different than that desired. Similarly, it is 'too late
for the ratifying bodies, or any of them, to declare that they did
not understand the words used in their generally accepted
sense. Ratification has frozen the communication process, and
the language must now be interpreted by the courts. The only
reasonable course of action for those institutions is to attribute
meaning in accord with the general significance of the language
used, eliminating special meanings are not within the legitimate "intent" of the framers. For only in this way can the process of constitutional amendment be rendered coherent, in the
sense of being predicated over the long run upon shared canons
of action between framers and ratifiers. Likewise, only in this
way can the process generally hope to avoid defeating the exhttps://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss4/3
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pectations of the ratifying states about the meaning of the provisions to which they are consenting."'
One of the most attractive features of the modern scholar-

ship, with the motivational approach to judicial action and policy orientation, is that it is easy. The rhetorical generalities it
employs are so much easier than the laborious pursuit of "intent" or "meaning," calling, as the pursuit does, on powers of

analysis and painstaking historical construction of context. However, to reiterate the main point, it is the support that the new
approach lends to anti-democratic forces that is one of its most

troublesome characteristics. For example, this same philosophy
or approach to law has carried over into a great many legal areas
causing each and every legal issue to .be analyzed simply as an
occasion for litigational competition for a favorable judicial pronouncement that is guided only by judicial "reason" rather than
majoritarian constitutional considerations. The vice chairman of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Daniel Leach,
can blithely declare that the Court's decision in United Steelworks of America v. Weber" 7 holding that Title VII of the Civil
116. R. Whitten, supra note 7, Part 11, at 39-42. Professor Whitten is careful to point
out that his statement that "the states are usually aware" of particular meanings assigned to terms means, of course, that the people in those states having anything to do
with the issues-congressmen, lawyers, judges, and the like-are aware. What the representatives of "the people" generally understood and intended when they created and
adopted a particular provision is the critical factor, since this is a representative democracy. "The American Constitution thus provides neither for a 'pure' or 'direct' democracy, nor for an 'aristocratic' or 'elitist' regime." Abraham, supra note 73, at 473.
Whitten's point is thus very close to if not identical to Joseph Story's opinion that
"nothing but the text was adopted by the people." J. STORY, CommrIMs ON THE CONsTrruTION OF THE UNrMrD STATES 288 (3d ed. 1858). Story, of course, explicitly rejected
any notion that the Supreme Court could revise the Constitution; his position that "the
policy of one age may ill suit the wishes or policy of another" militated against judicial
discretion. Id. at 315. "Arguments drawn from impolicy or inconvenience ought here to
be of no weight." Id.
117. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979). In Weber Justice Brennan wrote the Court's opinion applying the principal statute in question, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976), which makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privilege of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin," id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976), and which prevents such discrimination in the employment process. Despite the clear language of the
statute, and a background of legislative history that denies altogether the legality of such
discrimination, Justice Brennan upheld a discriminatory practice adversely affecting a
white employee, preferring to enforce the spirit of the Act rather than its plain meaning,
holding that that spirit permitted "voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish
traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." 99 S. Ct. at 2728.
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Rights Act of 1964 (forbidding employment discrimination) perThose who have suggested that this is a permissible judicial choice have not examined the legislative history with sufficient care; it demonstrates the only meaningful
interpretation that fair-minded participants in or observers of the legislative process
could have attributed to the already clear statutory language, as Senator Humphrey's
explanatory memorandum on the Act demonstrated. See A Concise Explanation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 15865 (1964).
The title does not provide that any preferential treatment in employment
shall be given to Negroes or to any other persons or groups. It does not provide
that any quota systems may be established to maintain racial balance in employment. In fact, the title prohibits preferential treatment for any particular
group. Any person, whether or not a member of a minority group, is permitted
to file a complaint of discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 15866 (emphasis added).
As Professor Richard Walker concludes, in the only manner honestly compatible
with the language, history, general understanding, and express representations about the
Act by those who sought its passage and who provided literally overwhelming evidence
supporting the general understanding of its meaning: "This passage makes it quite clear
that the understanding in the Senate both before and after the adoption of section 703(j),
was that preferences were neither required nor permitted." Walker, The Exorbitant
Cost of Redistributing Injustice: A Critical View of United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber and the Misguided Policy of Numerical Employment, 21 B.C.L. Rv. 1, (text immediately following note 226) (publication projected for Summer 1980).
Academics, however, approach the issue from on high, and supply the necessary
ambiguity when there is none, by predictably carrying us into the realm of "sensitivity" and "moral choice." See, e.g., Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, N.Y.
REv. BooKs, Dec. 20, 1979, at 37, 41-42 (1979). Professor Dworkin suggests that there
simply is no procedure for a court to use in interpreting the statute "that does not require
them to make a political judgment." Id. at 42. This may be literally true, but courts
could "make a political judgment" that would give the statute the meaning its drafters
openly sold to the public. What Dworkin demonstrates is how far afield one can go in
efforts to develop some unlikely meaning, and that it is almost always possible to go
astray if one's epistemology is sufficiently corrosive of general understanding. He has not
demonstrated, however, that the Court's decision in Weber truly reflects congressional
intent behind the statute.
It is critical to note that Dworkin seems to believe that plausible constructions
drawn from the words of the statute are really our only guides. In the context of a legislative process, as opposed to a mere philosophical interpretation of text, Dworkin's belief is
clearly not true, nor can it be true if the representative and democratic element in the
legislative process is to prevail. Other than statutory text, the representations made
about the effect of a proposed statute are the main things upon which an interested public or a legislative colleague bases an evaluation of the legality or wisdom of a proposal.
Dworkin would have us believe that voluminous and explicit representations that buttress the apparent meaning of proposed language are irrelevant to the final judicial interpretation of a statute. Would we ever vote for a measure, or encourage our representatives to do so, knowing full well that some undisclosed "meaning" contrary both to the
generally understood effect of the statute and to the explicit assurances of its proponents
will emerge in the application of the statute by the courts? Dworkin's view would render
legislative passage of a statute simply an uncontrollable delegation of policymaking functions to the courts. Legislation is a process in which the warranted meaning of statutory
language plays a part in rallying support of the public and of the members of a legislative
body. Properly understood, that process gives integrity and reliability to the formation of

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss4/3

32

Bridwell: The Scope of JudicialJuDic&L
Review: A RviEw
Dirge for the Theorists of Majori 649
1980]

mits discrimination in favor of blacks, is simply the "triumph of
reasonableness":118 "Putting aside the legal thicket-the nuances
and consequences-the Weber opinion is all about
reasonableness." 1 9
Leach could also casually put aside the "literal terms of this
statute"1 20 and emphasize its "historical background":' 2 1 fair
enough except that the statute clearly would never have passed
had this construction been publicly urged. (Is this more concealment of true purposes to secure passage, such as that attributed
to the framers of the fourteenth amendment?)
As Professor Richard Walker has demonstrated in a penetrating article,' 22 ihe dynamics of institutionalized result orientareasonable expectations and a degree of popular control over policymaking.
If, for example, one buys an automobile that is expressly warranted by the seller to
be free of particular defects for a year, the warranty relates to what the seller meant to
convey and what the buyer meant to buy. The warranty is thus essential to the resolution
of a dispute over such a defect. We do not simply look at the automobile; we do not
simply note that it is patently capable of mechanical failure, nor do we note that the
"moral choices" open to us permit alleviating the loss either to seller or buyer, depending
upon our appraisal of other factors besides the express warranty. The example is, of
course, overdrawn; there must, however, be limits on the extent to which apologists for
judicial legislation can have it both ways, limits beyond which the allegedly proper
"moral choices" occasioned by a statute become a clear violation of the legislative process that has served to educate all involved through the discourse and representations
surrounding the proposed measure. Dworkin's view permits a semantic exercise to supersede a process essential to representative government. Post hoc extrapolations thus replace the dynamics of representative government, so that we are finally stuck with what
we could have been told, rather than what we were actually told. An approach that more
effectively corrodes the reliability of spoken and written language could not be imagined,
and yet it appears in an essay on "how to read." The modernist's sense of irony is, if
nothing else, brilliant.
118. Leach on Weber: A 'Triumph of'Reasonableness', Legal Times of Washington,
July 23, 1979, at 23, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Leach on Weber].
119. Id. Leach described the efforts of Kaiser Aluminum as voluntary, but also acknowledged that "Kaiser went to a training program . . . to avoid possible difficulties
with the government." Id., col. 2. Since private parties per Weber can voluntarily establish racial quotas in hiring, "it follows inexorably that courts can order class conscious
action. ...."! Id. at 24, col. 2. This is the "triumph of reasonableness"? This is about as

"reasonable" and sensible as the current EEOC guidelines on personnel practices, pursuant to which an employer is told: "Generally it is best to require as little information
from the employment application as possible." 42 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 30, 1979,
at A-6.
120. Leach on Weber, supra note 118, at 23, col. 3 (paraphrasing words of Justice
Frankfurter without source citation).
121. Id. Is this similar to the "spirit" invoked by Professor Abraham? See Abraham,
supra note 73, at 478.
122. Walker, supra note 117. As Walker observes: "[C]areful examination of
Weber in the context of the numerical employment policy reveals a microcosmic view of
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tion and the related decline of the analytical tools essential to
the integrity of the legislative process have created a truly ironic
situation. The legislative branch speaks-as it did in Title
VII-to the people with a clear voice and in clear language. The
legislative history of the Title VII provision at issue in Weber
reveals, even through the comments of the strongest supporters
of that legislation, that a given result such as "reverse discrimination" was neither permitted nor contemplated. The contrary
interpretation, incompatible with the public will, was, however,
fixed by the Court and is binding upon those utilizing the
Court's opinions. What could never have been openly legislated
has been given by the judiciary as an entitlement-something
that Congress would have to act to undo. An attempt to undo
judicially created entitlements produced by decrees that are totally detached from legislative will probably would approach in
political difficulty any open attempt to pass a "reverse discrimination" statute to begin with.123 A very basic dynamic in the legan ominous symbiotic parasitism among the branches of government, by which they have
come to feed upon the illegitimate acts of one another, appropriating them for their own
unconstitutional purposes." Id. at (text immediately following note 8). His demonstration of the mutually beneficial usurpations of all three branches of the federal government is beyond the scope of this paper.
123. As Professor Walker's article demonstrates, see, e.g., Walker, supranote 117, at
(text accompanying notes 220-31), the race-defined preferences now being enforced
are clearly contrary to the express declaration of promoters of the statute during the enactment process, see Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII Qf H.R. 7152 Submitted
Jointly by Senator Joseph S. Clark and Senator Clifford P. Case, Floor Managers, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 110 CONG. Rnc. 7212 (1964). As Senator Humphrey remarked:
Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is nothing
in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court to require
hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial "quota" or to
achieve a certain racial balance.
That bugaboo has been brought up a dozen times, but it is nonexistent. In
fact, the very opposite is true. Title VII prohibits discrimination. In effect, it
says that race, religion and national origin are not to be used as the basis for
hiring and firing. Title VII is designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race or religion.
In Title VII we seek to prevent discriminatory hiring practices. We seek to
give people an opportunity to be hired on the basis of merit, and to release the
tremendous talents of the American people, rather than to keep their talents
buried under prejudice or discrimination.
110 CoNG. REc. at 6549. See also id. at 13078 (remarks of Senator Cooper).
There are of course other implications for the course-of-action sanction by Weber
that are beyond the scope of this essay. For example, although literal terms of Title VII
apparently forbid class or race-conscious hiring policies, the statute is interpreted to permit those policies if they are addressed to alleviating similar past actions against the race
or class that is to be benefitted by the present race-conscious action. Moreover, this same
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islative process is thus reversed. Specifically, it is the dynamic
that usually disfavors the promiscuous creation of new law and
interpretation encouraged but not mandated by Weber can permit courts to mandate the
same sort of racial hiring policy if deemed to be corrective. As Leach remarked:
[Tihe Act does permit class-conscious efforts to do away with the effects of
discrimination. If, on their own, employers can initiate class conscious action
to correct long standing patterns of discrimination without having to show that
they discriminated in the past, it follows inexorably that courts can order class
conscious action to correct discrimination which has been proven.
Leach on Weber, supra note 118, at 24, col. 2.
The significant thing about these measures is, of course, that the types of protection
contemplated in these basic constitutional provisions-the due process and equal protection clauses-were purely individual, while the legal treatment of equality has become a
class calculus, determined by one's racial, ethnic, or gender characteristics. The particular treatment of any individual is a process of bookkeeping designed to estimate the degree of past prejudice experienced by a competing but subject racial group or other
"class"; this past prejudice has presumably benefitted the now prejudiced class though
this does not seem essential. Whether one can be discriminated against is determined
exclusively by reference to his racial (or other) characteristics. The irony here seems to
me that the wholehearted pursuit of results, as opposed to basic principles addressed to
individuals as individuals, has produced a result that would have been unacceptable to
the framers of the seminal constitutional amendments speaking to equality, unacceptable
to the drafters of Title VII, and unacceptable to the public. Given the acknowledged
government force behind even the adoption of "voluntary" race-conscious programs, the
perversion of statutory law to permit exactly this appears suspect in light of the constitutional prohibition against such government action. As Professor Kurland remarked:
"There was, or should have been, little question that race was disqualified as a factor on
which government could rely when imposing burdens or allotting benefits among its people." Kurland, supra note 56, at 12.
Kurland clearly recognized the anti-democratic element in this new approach to law,
remarking:
This quota system or caste system or status system is purely a creature of
the courts and the bureaucracy. It is not a social policy established through
democratic expression, pursuant to which each person coants for one and none
counts for more than one, but rather through those guardians of government
that must be described as "politically irresponsible," i.e., without responsibility to any electoral constituency for the rules and decisions that they
promulgate.
Id. at 18.
Although the particular perversions and changes of the principles that can be realistically identified with the popular will is an interesting theme, suffice it to say that this
process of altering the basic concepts rooted in majority approval has naturally occurred
along with rejection of that approval itself. "[W]e have quickly moved toward a concept
of status measured by exactly those conditions that were once condemned by constitution
and law." Id. at 19.
I doubt whether any honest observer would actually allege that congressional approval of Title VII was a vote to return "from contract to status," id. at 2, that such an
effect could have ever won public approval, or that "the judicial distrust of the democratic process," which Justice Harlan Fiske Stone identified as a danger to the Constitution, id. at 19 (quoting A. MASON, HARLAN FsKE STONE: PmnLAR OF TH LAw 331 (1956)), is
sufficient to impose such a measure on society, whether it likes it or not.
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favors repose, disturbed only by legislative efforts addressed to
some particular problem that is reversed, so that the legislature
is challenged to exert its lawmaking will against the judiciary, to
undo new nonlegislative law produced by combined court pronouncement and government force, and to undo constantly proliferating legal rules sometimes based upon but contrary to its
own pronouncements in the same legal area. The proponents of
judicial legislation-and I classify any judicial act superseding
legislative will as such-have the benefit of institutional inefficiency in their struggle against the intelligent democratic settlement of issues; the legislature is relegated to the politically untenable role of confronting judically bestowed entitlements that
have superseded its own legislative pronouncements.
I do not doubt that the probable force of public will against
such things as "reverse discrimination" would render impossible
an attempt to democratically or legislatively achieve it as a matter of law. This probably justifies the roundabout achievement of
the result in the eyes of many observers. So be it. But the way in
which a consensus, regarding formulation and implementation of
constitutional or legal rules, has departed from the mechanics
and techniques essential to maintaining our legal system as an
essentially democratic and majoritarian one should be acknowledged openly.
The "stakes" or "costs" that so consistently obsess the new
apologists are nearly always calculated in the narrow terms of
results to particular isolated controversies while the discourse on
the institutional and political structure that figured so largely in
the constitutional literature of the past has been dropped altogether. It is not altogether clear why these institutional implications involved in individual policy decisions are largely ignored.
As Professor Philip Kurland observed, "[iln part, the price is democracy itself ...
."12 Along with the primary political tenets
of the Constitution, the particular policies reasonably identified
with various constitutional provisions naturally have also been
transformed, but that is another story.
Having addressed and exemplified some of the major
problems with the apologists' school, I shall now return to the
principal inquiry. The focus will be upon the basic characteristics of modem pro-activist constitutional scholarship. The analy124. Kurland, supra note 56, at 20.
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sis suggests the constitutional considerations that this school
should more directly address.
V.

CHAmRCISTIcs OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL LnmnruRn

Several characteristics of the opinion arrayed against Professor Berger's work have clearly emerged. First, it is essentially
apologetic. It justifies the Court's newly asserted extensive revisory powers by describing them as accomplished fact, a result of
claims the Court has already made, and, which are, as irreversible as inevitable. Being essentially apologetic, this view analytically confuses a narrative explanation of a controversial judical
development with a justification for it. Mere identification of a
trend is thought to validate it.
Second, criticism of Berger's work is, more than anything
else, based upon an appraisal of the perceived results, or "the
consequences of the Court's action,""' as opposed to adherence
to any intelligible articulated standards that would define the
limits of judicial power. Thus, apologists consistently warn of the
high "stakes" that attend any deviation from result orientation,
and emphasize the "value" of results the Court has produced or
the parade of horribles that would occur if its power were seriously questioned. The new popular scholarly consensus, thus,
largely identifies the policy debate with power, and approved results with legitimate judicial authority.
Third, the criticism is cocooned in qualifying expressions devoid of functional value or importance. These expressions are
designed to preserve the impression of some theoretical limits on
judicial authority, but are always, in fact, purely personal and
admonitory-for example, the admonition directed to the judiciary to be restrained or "sensitive,"' 26 to "respond to injustice,"'2
but only "so long as society tolerates . . . ."2 These statements
do not consist of independent intelligible principles, and are virtually always accompanied by an express or strongly implied
opinion that judicial will is superior to majority will. The limits
on proper authority are, like the legal rules such authority advocates, personal and dependent upon the expectation that the
125.
126.
127.
128.

Miller, supra note 90, at 507.
Kutler, supra note 30, at 526.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 523.
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wielders of self-defined power will be shrewdly tuned to popular
opinion, as well as "restrained." What the Constitution would
permit and what the Court can get away with are naturally poles
apart, as they would be in any society with a generally high respect for law and legitimacy of the trust law places in its responsible guardians. In the middle ground between these two poles,
vague personal admonitions that have replaced articulated principle as the substance of constitutional law has fostered a luxuriant growth of judicial power.
Fourth, Berger's critics frequently employ the assertion that
democracy has at least partially failed."' Sometimes the failure
is nothing more than *unwillingness of the electorate to demand
or compel particular measures attractive to critics of democratic
processes.'1° In this regard the apologist school most clearly discloses its deep, underlying dissatisfaction with majoritarian principles, and its fundamentally nondemocratic character.
Fifth, the new constitutional literature is, as the foregoing
characteristic suggests, basically nondemocratic. It admits of judicial action contrary to what was stated or admittedly intended
by particular provisions of the Constitution. This facet of the
new school generally involves expressed fear of "legislative tyranny" and "majoritarianism." It is clear, however, that our constitutional tradition has until very recently entailed protections
against a tyranny of the majority; those protections have resulted from limitations accepted by the majority and, in fact,
designed to curtail the power that the majority may itself exercise in the future. Today, our constitutional tradition entails no
ultimate connection with any majority approval, past or present.
In this last feature the new school represents a cleai and dramatic break with our past constitutionalism and theory of minority protection. All of the fundamental analytical questions
raised by this aspect of the new school are never addressed by it.
For example, one might ask what makes the tyranny of the minority-the •judiciary or those they favor-better than the tyranny of the majority? We get no answers.
Final characteristics of the views contrary to Berger's work
are its historical imprecision and its utter failure to acknowledge
historical evidence of theoretical refinements pertaining to judi129. See id.
130. Id. at 524.
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cial authority. The literature is normally content to simply identify judicial action with policymaking. 13 1 It contrasts the artificial
polar characterizations of judicial action as involving no discretion, the usual method of describing the older view of commonlaw authority, or involving all discretion. The complex middle
ground, occupied by a decisional structure that was mature by
the late eighteenth century, is lost in the fog intervening between
these artificial polar extremes. There were, however, intelligible
theoretical standards, inevitably called for by the common-law
process, designed to limit such judicial discretion. These objective standards, to which courts were held accountable, served to
distinguish judicial action from legislation. That these standards
were often imperfectly realized did not make their existence or
the pursuit of them any less of an important historical datum,
nor did it minimize the practical force these standards had in
directing the decisional process away from unaccountable policymaking. The dismissive, categorical rejection of such a datum
as per se incompatible with the Court's new post "seismic
change" mentality is yet another aspect of the school's essentially apologetic character.
To the careful observer who sifts through the bulk of the
modem constitutional scholarship and underscores all those
statements that are functionally descriptive of what the Court is
empowered to do, shorn of the imposing rhetorical trappings, it is
obvious that the modem scholarship normally consists of nothing
more than a declared consensus in favor of particular results.

131. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Forward: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975). "The more a rule is perceived to rest upon
debatable policy choices or uncertain empirical foundations the more likely it will be
seen to be common law." Id. at 34. See also R. BRmWELL & R. WHrrrEN, supra note 96.
Moreover, some assert that "the Court is a legislature," Hazard, The Supreme Court
as Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. Ray. 1 (1978), adducing ingenious historical evidence for

support, id. at 2-8.
This equation of common law and legislative power has proved popular among the

state courts. In Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969), "public policy" is described as a "molding device available to the judicial process by which changing realities
and the attending manifested rules of fair play may be incorporated into our corpus

juris." Id. at 715. If one distinguishes all the judicial techniques whereby a rule of law is
determined by the collective language of a large number of related cases from the simple

act of overruling a clearly applicable rule in a new case simply because the judiciary is
now dissatisfied with the policy it represents, one finds the latter power is of relatively

recent origin in Anglo-American legal systems (having previously been present in medieval jurisprudence also). See R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw 129 (3d ed. 1977).
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This school's literature merely constitutes a cumbersome method
of expressing approval through supportive journalism. That literature functions as the literary referendum of the legal academic
community calling for judicial action, and as a polling place for
the "intellectual elite" in which the options to avoid democracy
are proposed and approved. Nowhere is the intellectual decline
of an important facet of legal scholarship more clearly evident

than in this sad fact.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

It is a shame, though it is not surprising, that someone like
Art Buchwald has not stumbled upon the Supreme Court and
academe in the constitutional law area. I can just imagine the
cogency with which he would dramatize the foibles of their
newer theories. Picture the uninitiated observer being led into
the chamber of the "collective conscience" of constitutional law
academe, which has become incarnate, and open to interview.
The observer is ushered into his presence and told he can ask
one critical and important question on judicial authority. With
great deference, he asks:
Observer: "May the courts ignore the clearly discernible intentions of the framers of the Constitution and render decisions
that flatly contradict it?"
Answer: (sonorously) "Do you mean ever?"
Observer: "Yes, may they ever do it?"
Answer: "I cannot answer without more information."
Observer: "But does not constitutional law permit, in fact require, the discussion of principles, and does not the question of
whether the judiciary can do this entail a principle? The question is somewhat like can Congress pass a bill of attainder? Or
can the judiciary review the constitutionality of legislation?"
Answer: "All things are not equally clear-it is a Constitution
we are expounding."
Observer: "I see. Then you are not sure whether or not the
judiciary can do this. Otherwise, my question could be answered 'yes' or 'no'."
Answer: "The answer to your questions is known, but I would
still need more information before I can answer."
Observer: "What could possibly be needed besides the question: Can the judiciary ignore clearly expressed intent?"
Answer:

(long pause) "I must . . . well . . . could you give

me some idea about what was intended?"

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss4/3

40

Bridwell:
Review: A Dirge
for the Theorists of Majori 657
19801 The Scope of Judicial JuDicL
REvmw

The personified spirit of "con-law present" will not speak until the fix is in. If we are baffled at the "answers," we can expect
the same repetitious litany of pseudo-sociological cliches
designed: (1) to convince us that we are not "sensitive" enough
to the contemporary constitutional milieu, and thus, cannot
truly appreciate the need for sufficient flexibility to suspend
these literalistic hard-and-fast rules; and (2) to show us we do
not fully appreciate the "stakes" of our hypertechnical and "fossilized" approach to judicial decisionmaking. We are conditioned
to feel as unrealistic and uninformed as one who would prefer
Ptolemy to Copernicus. In what is one of the most incredible ironies in the whole array of academic apology, we are told that we
can transcend the "analysis of the reasoning of opinions" if we
read philosophers like John Rawls who can enlighten us to accept result orientation (or "the consequences of the Court's actions" as it is termed). Amazingly, one of the principal tenets of
Professor Rawls' work is that one essential component of a
proper, just constitution is that its essential features must be articulated before one is entitled to know where he fits into the
system'3 2 -the oracle must speak before the fix is in!
Berger scored the match point when the activists failed to
address his questions and his overwhelming proof directly, and
when the Court and most commentators failed to present anything more than pure apology, praise for results, and confusing
digressions when confronted with the issues he raised. I am convinced-to give Berger his due-that the magnitude of the question he raises and the magnitude of the visible analytical defects
in the response to it have been largely underestimated. We are, I
think, witnessing a constitutional transformation of the first
magnitude, and one that substantially alters the first principle of
our past constitutionalism: an ultimate commitment to the majority will, and a genuine willingness to harmonize power with it.
There is something a bit dishonest about this new school, a
certain selective blindness to the solid traditions of certain core
principles of constitutionalism. There is a sense of cynical appropriation of the terminology and trappings of a majoritarian constitution, but only so far as it supports the purest form of
realpolitic, and can soften popular antipathy to judicial action
by averting blunt questions about power and authority. The per132. J. RAwLs,°A THEORY OF JusTcE 195-201 (1971).
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sistent refusal to extrapolate from basic principles inherent in
the particular positions that new school proponents find so attractive, and to apply those principles generally and hypothetically conveys to me the distastefulness of an individual who simply refuses to play in all the cards on the table. In the
orchestration of the new constitutional law, the basic theme is
the often metaphysical apology for what has happened' 3 since
the nineteenth century and a persistent focus on results. Around
this theme one finds a heavily scored free-style section, in which
participants move about as unpredictably and creatively as an
Olympic figure skater or a musical soloist.' '4 Excessive passion,
fervent declamation, and impressive exhortation swirl in an awesome and stately cadenza of instructive eloquence. But like the
figure skater, they display much motion but do not seem to be
going anywhere. The basic theme is predictable enough to be
boring, and the entertaining extempore performance designed to
set it off begins to pall with repetition. It is then that the form of

the new school becomes sufficiently obvious to illuminate its
substance. The most serious aspect of this substance is quite
often the absurdity, the "arrant nonsense""' of its basic
premises.
Are we seriously expected to believe, as an asserted historical fact, that individuals who often and vigorously and explicitly
133. Some like geological metaphors, e.g., Lusky, supra note 58, at 407 ("seismic"
change), or parables based on physical science, id. at 409. When others really "rev up" to
achieve good results, they prefer metaphors based on homeopathic medicine:
To meet a massive problem, a massive dose of law is required. Liberal
judicial construction and a maximum enforcement effort are also essential. We
can count on the conservative forces-political, economic, legal, and social-to
protect their vital interests and thus to modify the effect of our legal formulation in the specific life situations. A broad statement of law is necessary to
begin to achieve meaningful results.
Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and The Concept of
Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REv. 59, 101-102 (1972). For a brilliant evaluation of the rise of pseudoscientific jargon in constitutional law literature, as well as some
of its implications, see Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. PA. L. REy. 1174, 1177 (1979).
134. I have borrowed this metaphor from Norris Hoyt, who used it to describe the
procedures followed by Panamanian public officials. Hoyt, More Than A Voyage Between
Oceans, SAIL, Dec. 1979, at 38, 40.
Since the area of the law has institutionalized so fully the polemic and rhetorical
journalistic approach, I have permitted myself a degree of journalistic license that would
arguably be unhelpful or inappropriate for a subject which primarily emphasizes
analysis.
135. Kurland, supra note 56, at 8.
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declared their opposition to unrestrained judicial modification of
the Constitution actually "intended . . .to empower the Court
to serve as the Founders' surrogate for the indefinite future"?' 3
Are we also to believe that implausible and strained extrapolations from indirect statements that they made demonstrate their
intent, as an historical fact, to legitimize a sweeping power that
they expressly condemned or that the "public" demands rule by
judiciary and clamors for the results it brings?
The conscription of Claudius Germanicus as Emperor of the
Roman Empire, in 41 A.D., was totally against his will. He reportedly declared: "I refuse to be Emperor. Long live the Repub1 7
lic!"'

But Claudius' subjects literally forced him to accept.

There is, in fact, no such clamor for the revolutionary judicial
powers exercised by the federal courts today, despite occasional
fatuous allusion in the modern apologia to "the people" or to
"forces" driving the judiciary "beyond the straightforward, orthodox conception of judicial review.'

1 38

There is just the Court

and its analysts, in positions of primary and perhaps moral responsibility, respectively. The common understanding essential
to the maintenance of a representatively democratic system is,
like the representations of a political candidate, a trust that all
silently and implicitly assume will be honored. The intellectual
structure of principle represented by the bewildering array of
concepts-common law, majority rule, limited authority, and
the like-rests mainly upon the straightforward intellectual honesty of its custodians, whether in the courts, the bar, or the university. The willing acceptance of this intellectual trust by individuals has enabled them to perpetuate some of society's most
valuable ideals, and hold them, however feebly, above the temptations of the moment, and occasionally above the "transient
benefit" 39 of attractive results that abandonment of the ideals
might facilitate. These ideals are autonomous and are useful
only within this intellectual trust; they are, thus, principles capable of being passed on over time-inheritable, as opposed to
results, which are not.
Just what has made the abandonment of the first principle
136. L. LUSKY, supra note 73, at 21.
137. R. GRAvs, I, CLAUDiuS 492 (1934).
138. Lusky, supra note 58, at 409.
139. Washington, supra note 109, at 18.
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of the Republic so painless among the constitutional law academy is hard to say, and why this abandonment is not counted as
part of the "costs" or "stakes" in the long-term constitutional
balance sheet is disturbing. Perhaps the saga of Claudius can
give us a final bit of instruction on the point. Claudius saw at
least one bright spot in the imperial role that was thrust upon
him, and it perhaps suggests the silver lining for academe as
well: "So, I'm Emperor, am I? What nonsense! But at least I'll
40
be able to make people read my books now."'

140. R. GRAVES, supra note 137, at 494.
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